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Abstract 
This paper uses evidence from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to examine 
how attitudes towards unsecured debt are related to household finances and other 
characteristics. An ordered-logit model is estimated for 1995 and 2000 using a self-reported 
indicator of financial distress as the dependent variable. This analysis suggests that the 
main factors causing debt problems are the unsecured debt-income ratio, the level of 
mortgage income gearing, the level of financial wealth of households, their health, ethnicity 
and marital status. While the proportion of households reporting debt problems did not 
change between 1995 and 2000, there were important shifts among different groups. In 
particular, more households in the youngest age group reported debt repayments were a 
heavy burden in 2000, while the opposite applies to the oldest age group where a smaller 
proportion of households than in 1995 reported debt was a heavy burden. These changes 
can largely be accounted for by the changing economic circumstances of these groups rather 
than an unrelated shift in attitudes. In particular, the increase in indebtedness of the young 
was the main factor accounting for their greater tendency to report debt problems. 
 
Key words: Unsecured debt, British Household Panel Survey, ordered-logit. 
JEL classification: C25, D14, D91 
 
 Summary 
Unsecured borrowing by British households, mainly in the form of personal loans, overdrafts 
and credit cards, has grown rapidly over the past decade or so. This has led to widespread 
concerns that many households have taken on more debt than they can easily afford, with 
possible future consequences for macroeconomic and financial stability. 
This paper examines survey evidence on the extent to which households consider 
unsecured debt to be a burden, using this as an indicator of financial distress. Its aim is to 
quantify the level at which unsecured debt becomes a problem for the typical household and 
what other factors affect this outcome. The paper uses evidence for 1995 and 2000 from the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which since 1995 has questioned households about 
their attitudes to unsecured debt. 
We examine how attitudes to debt are related to survey measures of the amount of 
debt that people have and its affordability. We find that, in general, there is a clear link 
between the subjective measure of financial distress and indicators of the affordability of 
debt. Our estimates suggest that the main determinant of debt problems is the unsecured 
debt to income ratio. There is no clear point at which debt becomes a problem, but our 
analysis suggests, for example, that having an unsecured debt-income ratio above 12% 
(the 70th percentile of households with any debt) adds at least 17 percentage points to the 
probability of unsecured debt being somewhat of a burden and 4 percentage points to 
the probability of it being a heavy burden, compared to households without any debt. 
Nevertheless, our estimates also show a general softening in attitudes towards debt, since 
the higher debt to income ratios observed in 2000 did not lead to an increasing likelihood of 
reporting debt to be somewhat or a heavy burden. We attribute this to the greater affordability 
of debt in 2000. 
Other than the unsecured debt to income ratio, the most important factors affecting 
the likelihood of a household reporting debt to be somewhat of a burden in 2000 were the 
level of mortgage income gearing, the level of financial wealth of the household, their health, 
ethnicity and marital status. Having mortgage income gearing above 20% of income added 
about 9 percentage points to the probability of reporting debt to be somewhat of a burden. 
Being unemployed was also associated with a higher probability of reporting debt problems. 
While the proportion of households reporting debt problems did not change 
between 1995 and 2000, there were important shifts among different groups. In particular, 
more households in the youngest age group reported debt repayments were a heavy burden 
in 2000, while the opposite applies to the oldest age group where a smaller proportion of 
households than in 1995 reported debt was a heavy burden. By income group, the main 
change was a sharp fall in 2000 in the proportion of very low income households who 
reported that debt was a heavy burden. 
The paper shows that these changes can largely be accounted for by the changing 
economic circumstances of different groups rather than an unrelated shift in attitudes. The 
increase in the median debt to income ratio of the young from just under 8% in 1995 to 
a level between 10% and 14% in 2000 was the main factor accounting for their greater 
tendency to report debt problems. 
While any given level of indebtedness was less problematic in 2000 than 1995, the 
increased quantity of unsecured debt taken on by these groups meant that they were 
more likely to face problems and be vulnerable to potential shocks in their income and 
interest rates. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the likelihood of reporting debt to be 
a burden increased for households with high debt to income ratios who also experienced 
 an adverse financial shock. This suggests that, while the greater indebtedness of British 
households in 2000 had not raised the perceived burden of debt, some would be more 
vulnerable to adverse economic shocks should these occur in the future. 
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1 Introduction 
Unsecured borrowing by British households, mainly in the form of personal loans, overdrafts 
and credit cards, has been growing very rapidly in recent years. This has led to widespread 
concerns that many households have taken on more debt than they can easily afford, with 
possible future consequences for macroeconomic and financial stability1.  
While the outstanding aggregate stock of unsecured debt of the household sector is 
small in relation to the stock of mortgage debt and financial assets, the threat it poses to 
macroeconomic and financial stability is likely to be related to how it is distributed throughout 
the population. Given that better risk borrowers are able to consolidate debt into mortgages, 
it is possible that unsecured borrowing is increasingly being used by those not able to borrow 
elsewhere because they have either exhausted their mortgage capacity or are considered 
high risk. Of course, this is not the only possible explanation of the increase in unsecured 
debt. A more benign interpretation is that stable macroeconomic conditions and increased 
competition among lenders have encouraged people to take on more debt without this 
increasing the burden it imposes on them. 
This paper examines survey evidence on the extent to which households consider 
unsecured debt to be a burden, using this as an indicator of financial distress. Its aim is to 
quantify the level at which unsecured debt becomes a problem for the typical household and 
what other factors affect this outcome. In general, the paper does not attempt to investigate 
the circumstances that have caused those households whose debt is a burden to get into 
that position2.  For some, the burden is understood and willingly taken on when the debt is 
initiated, whereas for others debt only becomes a burden when circumstances change. The 
paper uses the BHPS3, which since 1991 has asked broadly the same group of people about 
their economic and social circumstances. In 1995 and 2000, households and individuals were 
asked about their unsecured debt and since 1995 they have been questioned about their 
attitudes to it. More recent information on the burden of unsecured debt as of 
September 2004 using a specially commissioned survey is described in May, Tudela and 
Young (2004). 
Taken in isolation, self-reported attitudinal indicators of this type are difficult 
to interpret as different people may have different attitudes to the same economic 
circumstances. As such, they may not be very useful in measuring the objective economic 
circumstances that people face. Nevertheless, self-reported attitudes are important sources 
of information on the well-being of households. In this paper we examine how attitudes to 
debt are related to survey measures of the amount of it that people have and its affordability. 
We find that, in general, there is a clear link between the subjective measure of financial 
distress and indicators of the affordability of debt. This analysis allows us to highlight the most 
important factors in determining whether debt is likely to be considered a burden by 
households. Moreover, we are able to assess how attitudes have changed in response to the 
large increase in indebtedness of British households between 1995 and 2000. We find that 
the increased debt is not considered more of a burden in 2000 than it was in 1995. We 
attribute this to the greater affordability of debt in 2000. 
                                                                          
1. Recent analyses of this issue include Kempson et al. (2004). 
2. We investigate the factors that determine the level of unsecured debt in a separate paper [Del-Río and Young (2005)]. 
3. The BHPS is managed by the ESRC UK Longitudinal Studies Centre with the Institute for Social and Economic 
Research at the University of Essex. Detailed information can be found in Brice et al. (2002) available at 
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps/. The BHPS is an annual national survey whose sample has remained broadly 
representative of the population. The first wave corresponds to 1991 when 5,500 households and 10,300 individuals 
(aged over 16 years) were included. The sample excludes households located north of the Caledonian Canal in 
Scotland, and all new samples included in BHPS since 1997 are not considered in this paper since they only extend the 
coverage of some particular regions and groups of population. 
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a preliminary analysis 
of unsecured debt and financial distress for UK households in the BHPS. Section 3 
estimates the factors determining whether a household will face financial distress. 
Section 4 studies the role of financial surprises in explaining the probability of 
financial distress. Section 5 shows the distribution of estimated probabilities by age and 
income groups. Section 6 concludes. 
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2 Unsecured debt and financial distress in the BHPS 
The BHPS constitutes a unique source of information on the financial position and 
socio-demographic characteristics of a representative sample of British families. In this paper 
we focus on the information it provides on the burden of debt and its relation to the amount of 
unsecured debt and the general financial position of each household.  We first look at the 
distribution of unsecured debt across households and then analyse its relationship to the 
burden of debt. 
Information on the stock of unsecured debt is available from the BHPS for 1995 
and 2000 only. Unsecured debt in the BHPS covers financial commitments apart from 
mortgages and housing related loans. It specifically excludes credit card and other bills being 
paid off in full in the month of the interview. Respondents are shown a card prompting 
them about which forms of debt instruments they are using. In 1995, this card contained the 
following list of debt instruments: hire purchase agreements, personal loans (from bank, 
building society or another financial institution), credit cards, catalogue or mail order purchase 
agreements, DSS Social Fund loans, any other loan from a private individual, or anything else. 
Overdrafts and student loans were added to the list in 2000. 
This change in the list of unsecured debt instruments affects any analysis attempting 
to compare responses across the two waves of the survey. As both types of instrument were 
available in 1995, it is not clear how respondents with overdrafts or student loans would have 
included this type of borrowing in their answers to the survey at that time without being 
prompted4. For example, they could have considered borrowing on overdrafts as a form of 
personal loan. But the change in question must leave room for doubt that this was the case. 
If borrowing using these instruments were entirely omitted in 1995, but not 2000, then a 
comparison would overstate the increase in unsecured household debt. There is some 
evidence against this in that Redwood and Tudela (2004) find that unsecured debt is more 
underreported relative to aggregate figures in 2000 than in 1995. This might suggest that the 
new listed instruments in 2000 were included in other categories in 1995. Throughout this 
analysis we assess the sensitivity of estimates to this potential problem by changing the 
sample in 2000.  In particular, the analysis is usually presented both excluding and including 
households with student loans and overdrafts in 20005. In addition, since full-time students 
are the main holders of student loans and overdrafts we also take into consideration the 
exclusion of this group from the sample in both years. 
A likely reason for the addition of the student loan category in the 2000 survey is 
that loans had by then become the main form of financial support for students. Up to and 
including academic year 1997/98, students were funded under the system which was 
introduced in 1990/91, when non-income-assessed student loans were introduced to provide 
extra resources towards living expenses and partially to replace grants. The main grant 
rates were frozen at their 1990/91 values until 1994/95 when the shift from grant to loan 
was accelerated by reducing the level of grants and increasing loans. Further details on the 
extent of student loan finance are provided by Callender and Wilkinson (2003). This shift in 
the student finance regime towards loans is also likely to distort unsecured debt market 
participation and borrowing, especially among individuals and their families who have been 
students during the new regime. Again, we try to avoid this distortion by varying the sample to 
exclude those affected. 
                                                                          
4. Overdrafts represented nearly 7% of the total number of debt instruments mentioned in 2000. Student loans were a 
less significant 1% of total debt instruments and would have been less important in 1995. 
5. Note that households provide the total amount of debt they owe and the different classes of instruments they use. 
There is no information on the amount of debt by instrument. Therefore, when excluding households with overdrafts we 
are also excluding the debt that these borrowers may hold in other instruments. 
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According to the BHPS, around 48% of households had at least one form of 
unsecured debt in 1995 and 2000 (see Table A). If full-time students are excluded from the 
sample in both 1995 and 2000, this participation rate does not change (see last two columns 
in Table A)6. The average amount of unsecured debt7 of borrowers doubled over these five 
years. For borrowers, median unsecured debt was £1,000 per debtor household in 1995, 
and £2,500 in 20008. The median unsecured debt-income ratio increased from 5.5% to 9.0% 
per debtor household. This increase is still relatively high if borrowers with overdrafts and 
student loans are excluded in 2000 or if full-time students are not considered in both years. 
Households in the highest tail of the distribution (above the 90th percentile) had an unsecured 
debt-income ratio of 27.1% in 1995, while in 2000 this had increased to over 37.2%. 
 
There are significant differences in the proportion of borrowers and average 
unsecured debt across households according to the age of the head of the household 
(referred to subsequently as the age of the household) and income9. Around 70% of 
households aged 16 to 30 years old had at least one form of unsecured debt in both 1995 
and 2000 (see Table B). This fraction decreases with age to around 15% for households 
                                                                          
6. The participation rate is 0.46 if households with overdrafts and student loans are excluded. But this figure is not totally 
relevant for the comparison since in 2000 we are excluding households with other types of instruments. At an individual 
level, 185 out of 459 individuals only hold debt in the form of overdrafts or student loans. Excluding households with no 
debt (apart from that on overdrafts or student loans) the proportion of borrowers is 0.48 in 2000. 
7. If individuals cannot provide the exact amount they owe, they choose among some intervals. In particular, they are 
asked to indicate whether the amount they owe is more than £100, more than £500, more than £1,500, or more 
than £5,000. Depending on the case we assign a debt of £50, £300, £1,000, £3,250 or £7,000, to these cases 
respectively. This affects 310 individual borrowers (out of 6,889). In addition, if debt is a joint commitment we only assign 
half of the value. In 2000 which part of the debt is a sole commitment is known but we do not use this information since 
it is not available for 1995. Joint commitments affect 984 and 709 individuals out of 3,481 and 3,458 debtors in 1995 
and 2000 respectively. Once the debt variable for each individual is built, a household variable is determined by adding 
up the debt of all members. For each year, all unsecured debt values above the 99th percentile are recoded to the value 
of the 99th percentile. This is also done for unsecured debt-income ratios. 
8. If borrowers with overdrafts and student loans are excluded the median in 2000 is somewhat lower (£2,200). 
9. We use the annual household income provided by BHPS scaled by a conversion factor taking into account the effects 
of household size and composition. Income groups are percentiles of the income distribution for the total sample 
in 1995. For 2000 the percentiles are updated using the Retail Price Index. 
Table A: Household unsecured debt and debt-income ratios in BHPS (1995 and 2000) 
  1995 2000 2000 (a)  1995 2000 
      
Excluding full-time 
students 
Number of households with no unsecured debt 2,351 2,281 2,281  2,289 2,269 
Number of households with unsecured debt 2,181 2,189 2,110  2,112 2,113 
Proportion of households with unsecured debt 0.48 0.49 0.48  0.48 0.48 
        
Unsecured debt levels, for borrowers only       
 (nominal values,£)  mean 2,145 4,255 4,002  2,121 4,177 
 10th percentile 77 150 150  75 150 
 30th percentile 350 900 800  320 855 
 50th percentile 1,000 2,500 2,200  1,000 2,500 
 70th percentile 2,500 5,000 5,000  2,500 5,000 
 90th percentile 6,250 11,000 10,200  6,250 10,800 
Unsecured debt-income, for borrowers only (%)      
 sample size 2,180 2,181 1,979  2,112 2,109 
 mean 10.96 18.51 15.32  10.02 16.44 
 10th percentile 0.5 0.9 0.8  0.5 0.8 
 30th percentile 2.0 3.8 3.4  1.9 3.7 
 50th percentile 5.5 9.0 8.3  5.2 8.8 
 70th percentile 11.9 18.4 16.3  11.1 17.4 
  90th percentile 27.1 44.6 37.2   25.2 40.7 
(a) The number of households with unsecured debt excludes families whose debt is only in the form of student loans 
or overdrafts. Debt and debt-income ratios are calculated excluding households with overdrafts or student loans, no 
matter if they have other type of instruments. 
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older than 60 years old. Comparing 1995 and 2000, the participation of younger households 
seems to be larger in 2000, although their contribution to aggregate debt is relatively 
small given their small and declining weight in the population (see last columns in Table B).  
Participation in the unsecured debt market is clearly higher for households with income 
above the median, with around 60% of them having some form of unsecured debt in 1995 
and 2000. 
 
As Cox et al. (2002) showed, the debt-income ratio is negatively related with age 
in both 1995 and 2000 (see Chart 1). Debt-income ratios increased for every age group 
between 1995 and 2000. The increase for the youngest is difficult to quantify due to the 
introduction of new categories of debt to the questionnaire and the change in method of 
student finance. The increase is smaller when families with either student loans or overdrafts 
are excluded from the analysis10. For those younger than 60, debt levels do not vary very 
much across age, in both 1995 and 2000. 
                                                                          
10. Similar results are obtained when full-time students are excluded from the sample. 
Table B: Proportion of borrowers and sample weights by age and 
income  
 Proportion of borrowers  
% Total sample  
Exc. new type 
of instruments  
Excluding 
full-time 
students  
Sample 
weights of 
each age and 
income group 
 1995 2000  2000 (a)  1995 2000  1995 2000 
age groups           
16-30 67 75  73  70 73  18 16 
30-45 65 64  64  65 64  29 30 
45-60 55 52  51  55 52  22 25 
     60 + 14 16  15  14 16  29 28 
                 
Total 48 49  48  48 48  100 100 
           
income groups           
           
below the 10th 
percentile  38 38  33  35 28  10 7 
10th-30th percentile 31 30  29  30 29  20 16 
30th-50th percentile 45 42  41  45 41  20 22 
50th-70th percentile  56 58  57  56 58  20 20 
70th-90th percentile  61 60  59  61 60  20 23 
above the 90th 
percentile 60 57  56  60 57  10 12 
           
Total 48 49  48  48 48  100 100 
           
(a) Households with overdrafts or student loans and with no other type of unsecured debt are 
excluded. 
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The debt-income ratio is significantly higher than average for households below 
the 10th percentile in the income distribution in 1995 and much higher in 2000 (see Chart 2). 
The apparent change in the debt-income ratio between 1995 and 2000 is likely to be partly 
due to the change in the BHPS questionnaire and shift in the student finance regime. If all 
households with student loans and overdrafts in 2000 are excluded from the comparison, 
then the debt-income ratio for the lowest decile of the distribution actually falls between 1995 
and 2000. When full-time students are excluded, (Chart 3) the increase in debt-income ratio 
for the lowest decile is similar to that of other income groups. The debt-income ratio in 1995 
is slightly increasing between the 10th and 90th percentiles of the income distribution, but 
quite flat in 2000. Using the same real income thresholds, it is clear that the debt-income 
ratio increased between 1995 and 2000 for all income groups, with the sharpest increase for 
those between the 10th and 30th  percentiles of the income distribution. It is interesting to note, 
however, that the weight of the lowest-income group fell considerably during that time as real 
income levels increased (Table B), the general increase in income being relevant in explaining 
the increase in aggregate debt levels. 
 
Chart 1: Household unsecured debt and debt-income by age (of the head of the household) 
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(a) Excluding all families with student loans and overdrafts.    
 
Chart 2: Household unsecured-debt and debt-income by income
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(a) excluding all families wiht student loans and overdrafts
Mean unsecured debt (only debtors) by income
 constant prices 1995
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
below the
10th perc. 
perc 10-30 perc 30-50 perc 50-70 perc 70-90 above the
90th perc
£
1995 2000 2000 (a)
Unsecured debt-income ratio (median) by income
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
below the
10th perc. 
perc 10-30 perc 30-50 perc 50-70 perc 70-90 above the
90th perc
debt/income
1995 2000 2000 (a)
(*)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0512 
 
 
As noted earlier, the BHPS also provides self-reported information on the extent to 
which households consider their debt repayments to be a burden. They are first asked 
whether anyone in the household has to make repayments on hire purchases or loans, 
excluding mortgage loans but including DSS social fund loans. If the answer is ‘yes’11, 
they are then asked ‘to what extent is the repayment of such debts and the interest a 
financial burden on your household? Would you say it is a heavy burden, somewhat of a 
burden or not a problem?’ In both 1995 and 2000 around 30% of the debtor households in 
the sample reported their unsecured debt repayments to be ‘somewhat a burden’, while a 
further 10% thought them a ‘heavy burden’. We use this information as an indicator of 
financial distress. 
As shown in Chart 4, debtors reporting such problems tend to have higher 
unsecured debt-income ratios throughout the household income distribution. In addition, 
mean (and median) unsecured debt-income ratios of those reporting financial problems are 
higher in 2000 than in 1995. The mean unsecured debt-income ratio of those reporting 
debt to be a heavy burden was 16% in 1995 and 26% in 2000. This may suggest that 
households perceived a given debt-income ratio to be less burdensome in 2000 than 1995. 
When all the sample is used in 2000, the debt-income ratio of those in the lowest income 
decile who consider their debt to be somewhat of a problem or no problem is very high. This 
is not significantly reduced if full-time students or those with overdrafts or student loans are 
excluded from the sample (lower panel of Chart 4). 
                                                                          
11. In both 1995 and 2000, only 28% of households answered ‘yes’. However, in the financial section of the 
questionnaire, which is made on an individual basis, around 48% of the sample reported to have at least one form of 
unsecured debt. This apparent contradiction suggests that the household respondent might not be aware of the debt of 
other members in the family. It could also be the case that different type of debts are taken under consideration when 
answering both questions. This is obviously a problem with survey data, and the following analysis has to be made on a 
reduced sample of household borrowers. 
Chart 3: Household unsecured-debt and debt-income by income  
Excluding full-time students from the sample 
Unsecured debt-income ratio (median)  by income
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Chart 5 shows simple plots of the proportion of households reporting repayments 
to be a burden in different age groups. The proportion of households considering 
debt payments to be somewhat of a burden is slightly higher for younger households, both 
in 1995 and 2000. The difference across age groups widened between these years due to 
a fall in the proportion of households aged over 45 reporting that debt is somewhat of a 
burden. On the other hand, households considering debt a heavy burden were concentrated 
in the over 30 age groups in 1995. By 2000 however, there are no obvious differences across 
age groups except that a very low proportion of the oldest households reported debt to be a 
heavy burden. It appears then that those aged under 30 have become more concerned about 
debt, while those over 30 have become less concerned. 
 
These changes in the perceived burden of debt are likely to reflect shifts in the 
amount of borrowing undertaken as well as changes in household circumstances. The next 
section assesses the relationship between the subjective burden of debt and its possible 
determinants. 
 
 
 
Chart 4:  Self-reported indicator of financial distress and debt-income ratios by income group 
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Chart 5: Proportion of households under financial distress by age group 
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3 Relationship between indebtedness and the probability of debt being a problem 
In this section, we analyse the factors that determine whether households are likely to 
report problems in paying their unsecured debt. To assess this, and to interpret the results, 
the analysis is carried out within the context of a heavily simplified framework that relates the 
self-reported burden of debt to household circumstances. 
 
A simple framework 
We presume that households consider their unsecured debts to be a burden if the 
repayments force them either to increase their borrowing or reduce their consumption below 
some comfortable level. By the household budget constraint, it is possible to state simple 
conditions that are useful in characterising payment problems. The constraint can be written 
in simplified form as: 
i
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i
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t Dr1Dyc )( +−+= +  (1) 
where c is consumption, D is the stock of unsecured debt at the beginning of the period, y is 
total disposable income after mortgage interest payments and r is the interest rate on 
unsecured debt. Other assets and liabilities are assumed fixed in the short term. The amount 
of consumption that the household can afford without changing the stock of unsecured debt 
is itt
i
t Dry − . 
It is assumed that debt becomes ‘somewhat’ of a problem for household i at date t 
when the amount of consumption that can be afforded without changing the stock of 
unsecured debt falls below some comfortable level, itcˆ  and becomes a ‘heavy’ burden when 
it falls below a less comfortable level, itc~ . So, for household i, debt is a heavy burden 
if <− ittit Dry itc~ , somewhat of a burden if itittitit cDryc ˆ~ <−< , and not a problem if income 
net of unsecured interest payments is greater than this level. Suppose that these levels 
depend on household characteristics as follows: 
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where ity  is some measure of the household’s normal income, )(
1
t1 δ−  is the fraction of 
normal income that a representative household would regard as giving a comfortable level 
of consumption and 2tδ is the fraction of current income that would reduce consumption to 
such a level that debt becomes a heavy burden, itε  is an individual specific factor that may 
be related to age and other household characteristics such as the number of children 
that makes the perceived comfortable level of consumption for a particular household differ 
from that of a representative household. Let it
i
t
i
t u+= αε , where itα  reflects observable 
household characteristics determining consumption needs and itu  is a set of unobservable 
factors that determine a household’s attitude to debt. These factors, including the ‘mood’ of 
the household on the day of the survey, capture the subjective nature of the survey, including 
any reporting errors. 
Re-arranging these expressions, any household i at date t would state that debt is 
not a problem if 
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that it is somewhat of a burden if 
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In this simplified form, a household would report debt problems according to the 
value of a continuous latent variable Z relative to unobserved thresholds that are common to 
all households by design. The randomness in individual attitudes to debt is captured in the 
specification of the latent variable which is here determined by income gearing, normal 
income relative to current income and individual specific factors, related to observable as well 
as unobservable characteristics. 
This type of model can be estimated in cross-section using an ordered-logit 
approach where the parameters to be estimated are the values of the common thresholds as 
well as any parameters determining the value of the latent variable. The dependent variable is 
the self-reported indicator of financial distress (srifd). This variable takes the value 1 when the 
household reports no problem in meeting debt commitments, 2 when the household reports 
debt to be somewhat of a burden and 3 when debt payments are a heavy burden. The model 
we estimate is the following: 
 
Prob[srifdi =j] =Prob(kj-1 ≤ ’xi+ui ≤ kj) j=1,2,3                (7) 
 
where ixβ ′  represents the observable determinants of the latent variable and kj are the 
cut-off points with k0 = -∞, 11k δ= , 212k δδ += , k3=+∞. The variable ui, representing 
unobservable differences across households in their attitude to debt, is assumed to be 
logistically distributed: 
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Estimation 
In estimating this model, we include as explanatory variables the level of unsecured debt, 
household income, age, employment status, mortgage income gearing, financial wealth as 
well as race, education, health and marital status indicators. The level of unsecured debt is 
captured by dummy variables reflecting the position of the household in the unsecured 
debt-income distribution. We use dummy rather than continuous variables so as not to 
impose a particular functional relationship between the level of the debt-income ratio and the 
probability of reporting debt problems12. Income variables are also included separately so as 
not to restrict income to affect the reporting of debt problems only through the debt-income 
ratio: it is expected that those with higher income would be less likely to consider unsecured 
debt to be a problem for given levels of the debt-income ratio. 
The job status of the head of household is included to take account of whether 
household income is considered to be different to normal. It might be expected that the 
current income of the unemployed is below normal, thereby raising the likelihood that debt is 
a problem for them. 
We also include household tenancy status, and split up mortgage borrowers by their 
mortgage-income gearing level, expecting that those with high secured debt would be more 
                                                                          
12. While the model outlined above explained debt problems in terms of the flow of debt interest payments relative to 
income, data is only available on the stock position. The stock and flow positions are likely to be very highly correlated 
without substantial variation across households in effective interest rates. 
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likely to report unsecured debt payment problems. The estimation also takes account of the 
financial wealth of the household. We also consider other personal characteristics of the head 
of the household (such as gender, age, race, education, marital status and number of 
children) and six regional dummies. 
The sample includes all households with debt that provided information for 
the variables included in the regression. The pooled estimation covering 1995 and 2000 
includes 1993 households. In the main estimation, each variable is interacted with an 
intercept dummy for 2000 so that comparisons of all the coefficients and statistical tests for 
the significance of differences can be made across the two years. In addition, the results of 
the pooled estimation without this interaction, except for the constant term, are provided. This 
reduces substantially the number of parameters to be estimated, but also imposes the 
assumption that these are constant across the two years. The thresholds for all dummy 
variables except that for financial wealth are kept at their 1995 real values so that coefficients 
are comparable across the two years. 
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Note: The sample includes all households with positive debt providing the necessary information for variables 
included in the regression. The reference group includes the lowest indebted households, younger than 30, with 
high qualifications, income between percentile 50th and 70th, employed, owners with no mortgage and with positive 
financial wealth but below the sample median. Percentiles values are calculated for the total sample. The regression 
includes 6 region dummies and other demographic variables such as gender, marital status and number of dependent 
children. Percentiles for the debt ratio are calculated for 1995 and they are, respectively, 0.5%, 2%, 5.5%, 12% 
and 28.2%. Income percentiles are, respectively, £6,032, £10,051, £15,531, £22,385, £37,022 in 1995. In 2000 
they are updated with the RPI. Income gearing percentiles are 8%, 13%, 20%, in 1995, and 9%, 13%, 20% in 2000. For 
financial wealth median value corresponds to £2,750 in 1995 and £3,270 in 2000. 
Table C:  Ordered logit:  self-reported indicator of financial distress 
 Estimation with 2000 year interactions Pooled estimation 
No.observations 1993      1993  
Chi2  366  chi2(83)     312 chi2(42)  
Prob>chi2 0.00      0.00  
Pseudo R2 0.13    0.11  
log likelihood -1569    -1599  
     
Interaction with 
2000 year 
dummy   
 
Variable 
 
Coeff 
 
std.error 
Marginal 
Effect (a) 
Marginal 
Effect (b) 
 
Coeff 
 
std.error 
 
Coeff 
 
std.error 
Unsecured debt to income 
(by percentile) 
        
   between 10th and 30th 0.21 0.50 0.03 0.01 0.36 0.95 0.15 0.41 
   between 30th and 50th 0.42 0.49 0.06 0.01 0.40 0.91 0.30 0.40 
   between 50th and 70th 0.66 0.48 0.10 0.02 0.58 0.90 0.65 0.40 
   between 70th and 90th 1.04 0.49 0.17 0.04 0.24 0.90 0.89 0.39 
   larger than the 90th 1.60 0.50 0.27 0.09 0.39 0.91 1.52 0.40 
Age 
   aged 30 to 45 
 
0.43 
 
0.18 
 
0.06 
 
0.01 -0.56 
 
0.26 
 
0.17 
 
0.13 
   aged 45 to 60 0.50 0.22 0.08 0.02 -0.82 0.33 0.12 0.16 
   aged 60 or more -0.37 0.55 -0.05 -0.01 -0.61 0.73 -0.56 0.35 
Qualification        
   Medium 0.10 0.16 0.01 0.00 -0.57 0.22 -0.20 0.11 
   Low 0.56 0.22 0.09 0.02 -0.93 0.36 0.17 0.17 
Income (by percentile)         
   less than 10th 0.19 0.35 0.03 0.01 -1.26 0.72 -0.07 0.29 
   between 10th and 30th 0.07 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.63 0.42 0.31 0.21 
   between 30th and 50th 0.11 0.21 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.31 0.20 0.15 
   between 70th and 90th -0.02 0.20 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.28 -0.05 0.14 
   above the percentile 90th -0.05 0.27  -0.01 0.00 -0.80 0.38 -0.45 0.18 
Job status         
   Self-employed -0.55 0.25 -0.06 -0.01 0.53 0.34 -0.31 0.17 
   Unemployed 0.89 0.38 0.14 0.03 -0.71 0.64 0.63 0.29 
   Retired 0.79 0.58 0.13 0.03 -0.46 0.74 0.44 0.34 
   Full-time student                 0.24 0.53 0.03 0.01 -0.80 0.85 -0.15 0.42 
   Other -0.13 0.29 -0.02 0.00 0.14 0.43 -0.09 0.21 
Housing Status         
   not owner 0.42 0.31 0.06 0.01 0.33 0.48 0.50 0.23 
   owner, income gearing<p25 -0.05 0.34 -0.01 0.00 0.41 0.51 0.09 0.25 
   between 25th and 50th -0.13 0.34 -0.02 0.00 0.43 0.50 0.04 0.24 
   between 50th and 75th 0.37 0.31 0.06 0.01 0.16 0.49 0.41 0.24 
   larger than 75th 0.61 0.33 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.50 0.60 0.24 
Financial Wealth         
   zero fin.wealth 0.51 0.19 0.08 0.02 -0.20 0.27 0.41 0.13 
   Fin wealth>median  -0.67 0.18 -0.08  -0.01 0.16 0.25 -0.58 0.12 
Personal Characteristics         
   poor health 1.04 0.29 0.17 0.04   -0.20 0.40 0.90 0.20 
   Minority ethnic 0.27 0.38 0.04 0.01 0.38 0.53 0.45 0.28 
   Female 0.07 0.20 0.01 0.00 -0.21 0.27 0.01 0.13 
   Divorced 0.40 0.25 0.06 0.01 0.49 0.34 0.60 0.17 
   widow/separated 0.21 0.44 0.03 0.01 -0.19 0.73 0.10 0.35 
Time effects and cut-off 
points 
       
year 2000     -0.27 1.09 -0.24 0.10 
   k1 1.37 0.66     1.04 0.50 
   k2 3.65 0.66     3.25 0.51 
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Table C lists the estimated coefficients β, the cut-off points k1 and k2 and the 
marginal effects. The final two columns are for the pooled estimation without interactions 
(except for the constant). The marginal effect of each characteristic on the probability of debt 
being reported to be either somewhat of a problem (column a) or a heavy burden (column b) 
are presented using the coefficients without the interaction for 2000. This estimation was also 
carried out excluding full-time students and the conclusions were qualitatively the same. 
For the reference group, the probability of reporting debt problems is determined 
solely by the estimated value of the cut-off points, k1 and k2 (see bottom lines in the table). It is 
estimated that in 1995 the probability of a member of the reference group reporting no 
problems was 0.80, the probability of reporting that debt is somewhat of a burden was 0.18 
and the probability of reporting it to be a heavy burden was 0.0313. These differences among 
the reference group in the probability of facing debt problems highlight the fact that even 
people with what appear to be the same economic circumstances can interpret those 
circumstances differently. It is reassuring though that the majority of people in the reference 
group would be expected to be in agreement on whether they faced debt problems or not. 
The inclusion of a time dummy for 2000 makes it possible to test whether there 
is any evidence of a significant change between 1995 and 2000 in the likelihood of the 
reference group reporting financial distress. This term is significant in the pooled estimation 
that does not allow other coefficients to vary across the two years, suggesting that there was 
an easing of financial coefficients across these two years. But this decline is not evident 
once other interactions are allowed for. This suggests that there was a general decline in the 
likelihood of reporting financial distress between 1995 and 2000, but that it was more 
apparent for other groups than the reference groups. The most significant changes point to 
there being less financial pressure for those aged between 30 and 60, those without high 
qualifications and those at the extremes of the income distribution. This will be commented 
on further below. 
 
Unsecured debt-income ratio 
There is clear evidence that the likelihood of reporting difficulties with debt is monotonically 
increasing in the unsecured debt-income ratio14. According to the marginal effects, having an 
unsecured debt-income ratio between 12% (the 70th percentile) and 27% (the 90th percentile), 
rather than below 0.5% as for the reference group, would add 17 percentage points to 
the probability of unsecured debt being somewhat of a burden and 4 percentage 
points to the probability of it being a heavy burden. Thus, for a household with characteristics 
otherwise the same as the reference group, the probability of debt being reported to be 
somewhat of a burden would be 35% rather than 18%. The probability of it being reported 
to be a heavy burden would be 7% rather than 3%. For those otherwise like the reference 
group but having debt just above 28% of income (the 90th percentile), the probability of debt 
being reported to be a heavy burden would be around 12% and the probability of debt being 
reported to be somewhat of a burden would be around 45%. The interaction of debt-income 
ratio with a dummy variable for 2000 is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that the 
probability of reporting problems is virtually identical in both years for those with unsecured 
debt greater than around 12% of income. However, the general increase in indebtedness 
in Britain between 1995 and 2000 has raised the proportion of households in the highest 
debt group from 10% in 1995 to 20% in 2000. While this would tend to increase the 
                                                                          
13. That is, the probability of no problem for the reference group is given by exp(1.37)/[1+exp(1.37)]. 
14. The fact that debt problems are generally increasing in the debt-income ratio suggests that there are no clear 
thresholds for this ratio which, once crossed, move a household from one state to another. If this were the case, the 
coefficient on debt-income ratios below the threshold would be small and insignificant, only becoming large and 
significant for those above the threshold. In this way the probability of facing debt problems would move from close to 
zero to close to one as the threshold were crossed. Instead, it is likely that the level of any such thresholds vary by 
household. In this sense the appropriate information is the proportion of households of a particular type that would face 
debt problems with debt-income ratios above a particular threshold.  
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proportion of the population reporting some kind of debt problem, this is being offset by a 
lower propensity to have debt problems induced by other variables. 
 
Income effects 
There are a number of ways in which income levels affect the likelihood of reporting debt 
problems. Incomes enter indirectly via the unsecured debt-income ratio and the mortgage 
income gearing terms and also directly through the income percentile terms. None of the 
latter are significant in the basic specification. But there is evidence that some of the direct 
income effects were significant in 2000: an income level below the 10th percentile and above 
the 90th percentile reduced the probability of debt being somewhat of a burden (relative to 
income between the 50th and 70th percentiles) by 12 and 9 percentage points, respectively. In 
the first case this is likely to be associated with the number of low income students with high 
debt income ratios who do not find debt to be a burden. In the second case, it suggests that 
a given unsecured debt-income ratio is less onerous for people with high incomes. While this 
effect is plausible and consistent with the theoretical model, it is not clear why it was not 
apparent in 1995. 
 
Job status 
Being unemployed adds significantly to debt problems, while the self-employed, who may 
require debt for their business, find debt to be less of a problem than others with similar 
characteristics. Both of these effects are less apparent in 2000 than in 1995, but the change 
is not statistically significant. 
 
Housing status and mortgage debt 
Housing status is expected to affect the likelihood of reporting debt problems through 
two channels. First, those with mortgage debt face an additional drain on their resources, 
tending to make it more likely that they will face debt problems. Second, those who own their 
own house will tend to be able to borrow on better terms than those in rented 
accommodation, tending to make it less likely that they will face debt problems. The first 
effect seems to be present in the data to some extent. The likelihood of reporting unsecured 
debt problems is increasing in the level of mortgage income gearing. Having mortgage 
interest gearing above 20% (the top quartile of the distribution) adds 10 percentage points to 
the probability of finding unsecured debt to be somewhat of a burden. On the other hand 
those who are not owners and might be paying rent also seem more likely to consider debt a 
problem, although the results are statistically significant only for the pooled estimation. 
 
Financial assets 
Having financial assets contributes to a lower probability of reporting debt problems, although 
the effect is not quantitatively very large. Having financial assets above the median of £2,750 
and £3,270 in 1995 and 2000, respectively, reduced the probability of reporting any debt 
problems by 8 percentage points.  
 
Household characteristics 
Demographic and other more permanent household characteristics also affect the likelihood 
of reporting debt problems. The reference group contains households headed by those 
aged under 30. In 1995, those between 30 and 60 were more likely to report that debt was a 
burden, other things equal. This would suggest that young people had a more relaxed 
attitude to debt than their elders. This relative effect is not evident in 2000, suggesting 
that attitudes to debt are not related to age for those under 60. The reduction between 1995 
and 2000 in the propensity to report debt problems among the over-30s is one of the more 
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significant changes highlighted by this analysis. The evidence also suggests that being 
divorced, non-white or in poor health are positively linked to the likelihood of reporting debt 
problems. 
 
Goodness of fit 
An overall measure of the goodness of fit of the model is the number of responses that are 
correctly classified according to whether they report debt problems or not. We classify 
responses according to the predicted probability that debt is not a problem for each 
household. If this predicted probability is greater than 0.55, then we classify the household as 
not having a problem, if it is between 0.25 and 0.55 we classify it as having somewhat of 
a burden and if it is less than 0.25 we classify it as having a heavy burden. The probability 
thresholds are chosen to match the overall proportions in the three categories of attitudes to 
debt. 
Table D: Goodness of fit 
 
predicted and correctly 
classified 
people wrongly 
classifed 
total 
    %  %   
           
No problem 881 75 290 25 1171.0 
Somewhat a problem 278 44 355 56 633.0 
Heavy problem 80 42 109 58 189.0 
          
Total 1239 62 754 38 1993.0 
Notes: Responses classified according to the predicted probability of debt not being a problem (prno). No problem if 
prno>0.55, somewhat of a problem if 0.55>prno>0.25 and a heavy burden if prno < 0.25. 
 
Table D shows that 62% of households are classified correctly on this basis. This 
varies according to the classification. By construction, the model classifies about 60% of 
households as not reporting a problem. This is correct for 75% of these households, but 25% 
of them claim to have a problem with debt. At the other extreme, about 10% of households 
are classified as finding debt to be a heavy burden. This classification is correct for 42% of 
these households, but 58% of them deny that debt is such a problem. As would be expected 
in a model with statistically significant coefficients, these classifications are substantially 
better than would be obtained if households were classified randomly. In that case the 
proportions correctly classified would be approximately 60%, 30% and 10% for the not a 
problem, somewhat of a burden and heavy burden categories respectively. The errors reflect 
the point made earlier that even people with the same observed circumstances have different 
attitudes to debt. The important point is that the econometric analysis is able to distinguish 
the economic characteristics of debtors that contribute to the reporting of debt problems. 
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4 Overindebtedness and the role of financial surprises 
The significance of the coefficients and the size of the marginal effects in the preceding 
estimation results points to debt-income ratios as the main variables explaining differences 
among households in the probability of reporting debt repayment problems. But there is likely 
to be a difference between those households whose financial circumstances are turning out 
as planned and those who have faced unpleasant financial surprises. To test the role of 
negative financial surprises in causing debt payment problems, we add to the previous model 
a variable that takes account of whether a household has had an adverse financial surprise. 
This variable has previously been used by Böheim and Taylor (2000) in their study of housing 
payment problems. It consists of the difference between the reported change in the financial 
situation of a household in a particular year and the expected change in the financial situation 
for the forthcoming year as reported in the previous year. We assume that a household 
has suffered a negative financial shock if the expected change in the financial situation was 
better than the actual change reported one year ahead. The variable for financial surprises is 
interacted with the unsecured debt-income ratio and we include contemporaneous and 
lagged values. Specifically, for those with debt-income ratios above the 70th percentile: those 
not affected by negative financial shocks in the past two years, those who experienced a 
financial shock in one year or the other and those who experienced a shock in both years. 
Because the household needs to be observed in the two previous years, the sample is 
reduced to 838 and 871 households in 1995 and 2000 respectively. 
The inclusion of the financial surprise variable leads to some modification of 
the previous results. In particular there is evidence that having a high unsecured 
debt-income ratio is not sufficient to raise the probability of reporting debt problems for 
certain levels for debt. The pooled estimation shows that those with debt-income ratios 
between the 70th and 90th percentiles only had a significantly higher probability of reporting 
debt problems if they had also suffered a negative financial surprise in the current or 
previous period (see Table E). The coefficients of the other variables included in the equation 
(not shown in Table E) do not show large changes, although unemployment and the dummy 
variable for households with the largest mortgage income gearing reduce their significance 
when introducing negative financial shocks. This suggests that these variables might be 
picking up the effect of an adverse financial shock. When variables are interacted with 
the 2000 dummy variable the standard errors of the estimation increase significantly and the 
differences between 1995 and 2000 are not statistically significant. 
The importance of these results is that they show that the likelihood of reporting debt 
problems is greater when high debt-income ratios are combined with negative financial 
surprises. This indicates that unsecured debt raises the vulnerability of households to adverse 
shocks. 
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Table E: Ordered logit including financial surprises 
 
 
Pool estimation 2000 year interaction
No.observations 1703 1703
chi2(95) 302 359
Prob>chi2 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.13
log likelihood -1337 -1312
variable Coeff std.error Coeff std.error Coeff std.error
unsecured-debt to income 
between perc. 10th and 30th -0.17 0.36 0.01 0.57 0.69 0.95
between 30th and 50th 0.29 0.35 0.35 0.55 0.30 0.91
between 50th and 70th 0.39 0.34 0.43 0.54 0.86 0.90
between 70th and 90th no neg shock 0.41 0.36 0.64 0.57 0.41 0.92
neg surprise (t-1) 0.67 0.41 0.86 0.63 0.08 1.00
neg surprise 1.25 0.37 1.04 0.62 0.41 0.99
neg surprise (t) and (t-1) 1.71 0.42 1.62 0.65 0.54 1.04
larger than the perc.90th no neg shock 1.03 0.40 0.87 0.60 0.57 0.95
neg surprise (t-1) 1.27 0.46 1.07 0.68 0.92 1.05
neg surprise 1.94 0.45 2.03 0.67 0.31 1.00
neg surprise (t) and (t-1) 2.22 0.47 2.57 0.81 0.29 1.11
Interaction with 
dummy for year 
2000
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5 Distribution of estimated probabilities by income and age groups 
The estimated relationships described above show the influence of different factors on the 
likelihood of reporting debt problems and how they have changed over time. In this section 
we look at the probability of debt problems being reported for different groups of households, 
taking account of their different circumstances but not allowing for unobserved individual 
effects. By stripping out the individual effects, it is possible to show on a standardised basis 
where in the population debt problems are most likely to be reported.  
Table F shows mean predicted probabilities of reporting debt problems by age and 
income group taking account of the actual circumstances of those in each group. In general, 
debt problems are most likely to be reported among households headed by 30-45 year 
olds towards the lower end of the income distribution. In both 1995 and 2000 households 
headed by 30-45 year olds with income between the 10th and 30th percentiles of the income 
distribution had a 45% chance of reporting that unsecured debt was somewhat of a burden 
and over a 20% chance that they would consider it a heavy burden. While the likelihood of 
reporting debt problems is smaller at higher income levels, the chances of debt being 
considered a problem are not negligible. The main change between 1995 and 2000 is that 
debt is estimated to be seen as less of a problem by those in the bottom decile of the income 
distribution. This is a puzzle that arises out of the estimation results and is a reflection of the 
change in attitudes towards debt of those with low incomes. Note that this is unlikely to 
reflect the effect of student debt as it is apparent across all age groups at low incomes15. 
Otherwise, the main difference between 1995 and 2000 is that the likelihood of reporting debt 
problems has increased for the under-30s at all parts of the income distribution apart from 
those in the highest and lowest income deciles. For older households and those in the upper 
and lower tail of the income distribution there is an estimated reduction in the probability of 
facing debt problems in spite of the increase in their indebtedness. 
 
                                                                          
15. The table is also calculated excluding full-time students from the sample and changes are minor. 
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 Table F: Estimated probabilities by income and age groups
mean std.dev mean std.dev mean std.dev mean std.dev
income < perctile10th
age -30 0.46 0.07 ** 0.30 0.14 0.22 0.13 ** 0.06 0.04
aged 30 to 45 0.47 0.05 ** 0.31 0.14 0.29 0.14 ** 0.08 0.07
aged 45to 60 0.44 0.13 0.27 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.15 0.21
aged +60 0.39 0.06 0.09 0.03
p10 < income < p30
age -30 0.40 0.09 0.41 0.09 0.12 0.08 ** 0.23 0.20
aged 30 to 45 0.45 0.07 0.46 0.07 0.21 0.14 0.24 0.15
aged 45to 60 0.39 0.11 0.44 0.09 0.14 0.14 * 0.24 0.15
aged +60 0.34 0.13 0.31 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.05
p30 < income < p50
age -30 0.38 0.10 ** 0.42 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.11
aged 30 to 45 0.39 0.11 0.41 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.11
aged 45to 60 0.39 0.12 0.36 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.11
aged +60 0.33 0.10 ** 0.22 0.11 0.09 0.08 ** 0.04 0.03
p50 < income < p70
age -30 0.31 0.11 ** 0.37 0.10 0.07 0.04 ** 0.12 0.11
aged 30 to 45 0.34 0.11 0.36 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.06
aged 45to 60 0.32 0.12 0.29 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
aged +60 0.23 0.12 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
p70 < income < p90
age -30 0.25 0.11 ** 0.35 0.13 0.05 0.04 ** 0.10 0.07
aged 30 to 45 0.31 0.12 0.30 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07
aged 45to 60 0.28 0.12 ** 0.23 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
aged +60 0.17 0.08 0.17 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.06
income > p90
age -30 0.20 0.11 0.19 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02
aged 30 to 45 0.25 0.11 ** 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
aged 45to 60 0.23 0.11 ** 0.15 0.11 0.04 0.04 * 0.03 0.04
aged +60 0.29 0.18 ** 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.05 * 0.01 0.00
Note: Mean and standard deviation of fitted probabilites by income and age group are calculated. The symbol (**)/(*) indicates 
whether the difference between the mean in 1995 and the mean 2000 is statitically different from zero at 5%/10%.
Estimated probabilities
1995 2000
Debt being somewhat a burden Debt being a heavy burden
1995 2000
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 31 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0512 
6 Conclusions 
According to the BHPS the average level of unsecured debt held by borrowers almost 
doubled between 1995 and 2000. Despite this, the proportion of households reporting that 
unsecured debt is somewhat of a burden or a heavy burden did not change between these 
two years. Is it possible to reconcile these disparate trends? 
One possible reconciliation is to argue that self-reported indicators of the burden of 
debt are entirely subjective and bear little relation to objective reality. As such, it would not be 
surprising for the perceived burden of debt to be unrelated to increased indebtedness. 
This argument is not correct though, as we are able to reject the hypothesis that our 
subjective measures of the burden of debt are entirely random. Instead, our estimates show a 
systematic relationship between the perceived burden of debt and a range of determining 
factors. 
These estimates, derived from an ordered-logit model of the probability of reporting 
debt problems, suggest that the main determinant of debt problems is the unsecured 
debt-income ratio. There is no clear point at which debt becomes a problem, but our 
analysis suggests, for example, that having an unsecured debt-income ratio above 12% 
(the 70th percentile of households with any debt) adds at least 17 percentage points to 
the probability of unsecured debt being somewhat of a burden and 4 percentage points 
to the probability of it being a heavy burden compared to households without any 
debt. Nevertheless, our estimates also show a general softening in attitudes towards debt, 
since the higher debt-income ratios observed in 2000 do not lead to an increasing likelihood 
of reporting debt to be somewhat of or a heavy burden. 
Other than the unsecured debt-income ratio, the most important factors affecting the 
likelihood of a household reporting debt to be somewhat of a burden in 2000 are the level 
of mortgage income gearing, the level of financial wealth of the household, their health, 
ethnicity and marital status. Having mortgage income gearing above 20% of income adds 
about 9 percentage points to the probability of reporting debt to be somewhat of a burden. 
Being unemployed is also associated with a higher probability of reporting debt problems. 
While the proportion of households reporting debt problems did not change 
between 1995 and 2000, there are important shifts among different groups. In particular, 
more households in the youngest age group report debt repayments to be a heavy burden 
in 2000, while the opposite applies to the oldest age group where a smaller proportion of 
households report debt to be a heavy burden than in 1995. By income group, the main 
change is a sharp fall in 2000 in the proportion of very low income households who report 
that debt is a heavy burden. 
The paper shows that these changes can largely be accounted for by the changing 
economic circumstances of different groups rather than an unrelated shift in attitudes. 
The increase in the median debt-income ratio of the young from just under 7.7% in 1995 to a 
level between 10% and 14% in 2000 is the main factor accounting for their greater tendency 
to report debt problems.  
These estimates are used to predict the probability that an individual household will 
report that it faces debt problems. When the mean predicted probabilities are calculated for 
different age and income groups, it is found that the households with the largest probability 
of reporting problems tend to be young and at the lower end of the income distribution. 
This reflects the fact that young households are more likely to participate in the unsecured 
debt market and have higher debt-income ratios. Moreover, comparing 1995 and 2000, it is 
the younger and less well-off households whose probability of facing debt problems has 
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increased. While any given level of indebtedness is less problematic in 2000 than in 1995, the 
increased quantity of unsecured debt taken on by these groups means that they are more 
likely to face problems and be vulnerable to potential shocks in their income and interest 
rates. Moreover the evidence suggests that the likelihood of reporting debt to be a burden is 
increased for high debt-income households who have also experienced an adverse financial 
shock. This suggests that while the greater indebtedness of British households in 2000 had 
not raised the perceived burden of debt, some of them are more vulnerable to adverse 
economic shocks should these occur in the future. 
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